Coordinates	41°52′55″N87°37′40″N
Native name	''O‘zbekiston RespublikasiЎзбекистон РеспубликасиO'zbekstan Respublikası''
Conventional long name	Republic of Uzbekistan
Common name	Uzbekistan
Image coat	Coat of Arms of Uzbekistan.svg
Symbol type	Emblem
National anthem	National Anthem of the Republic of Uzbekistan"O‘zbekiston Respublikasining Davlat Madhiyasi"
Official languages	Uzbek
Regional languages	Karakalpak
Languages type	Language for inter-ethnic communication
Languages	Russian
Capital	Tashkent
Largest city	Tashkent
Ethnic groups	80.0% Uzbek5.5% Russian5.0%–5.5% (Official Uzbek Statistics), (30% Foltz, Cordell, Jonson) Tajik3.0% Kazakh2.5% Karakalpak1.5% Tatar2.5% Others
Demonym	Uzbek
Government type	Presidential Republic
Leader title1	President
Leader name1	Islam Karimov
Leader title2	Prime Minister
Leader name2	Shavkat Mirziyayev
Sovereignty type	Independence
Sovereignty note	from the Soviet Union
Established event1	Formation
Established date1	1747
Established event2	Uzbek SSR
Established date2	October 27, 1924
Established event3	Declared
Established date3	September 1, 1991
Established event4	Recognized
Established date4	December 8, 1991
Established event5	Completed
Established date5	December 25, 1991
Area rank	56th
Area magnitude	1 E11
Area km2	447,400
Area sq mi	172,742
Percent water	4.9
Population estimate	27,606,007
Population estimate rank	45th
Population estimate year	2009
Population density km2	61.4
Population density sq mi	159.1
Population density rank	136th
Gdp ppp	$85.188 billion
Gdp ppp year	2010
Gdp ppp per capita	$3,015
Gdp nominal	$37.290 billion
Gdp nominal year	2010
Gdp nominal per capita	$1,320
Hdi	0.617
Hdi rank	102nd
Hdi year	2010
Hdi category	medium
Fsi	93.5 0.9
Fsi year	2007
Fsi rank	22nd
Fsi category	Alert
Gini	26.8 0.21
Gini year	2000
Gini rank	95th
Gini category	low
Gene	10.2 0.02
Gene year	2004
Gene rank	101st
Currency	Uzbekistan som (O'zbekiston so'mi)
Currency code	UZS
Country code	UZB
Main religion	Islam
Time zone	UZT
Utc offset	+5
Time zone dst	not observed
Utc offset dst	+5
Drives on	right
Cctld	.uz
Calling code	998
Footnote1	As Emirate of Bukhara, Kokand Khanate, Khwarezm. }}

Uzbekistan (), officially the Republic of Uzbekistan (‘zbekiston Respublikasi'' or Ўзбекистон Республикаси, Üzbekiston Respublikasi) is a doubly landlocked country in Central Asia. It shares borders with Kazakhstan to the west and to the north, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the east, and Afghanistan and Turkmenistan to the south. Prior to 1991, it was part of the Soviet Union.

Once part of the Persian Samanid and later Timurid empires, the region was conquered in the early 16th century by Uzbek nomads, who spoke an Eastern Turkic language. Most of Uzbekistan’s population today belong to the Uzbek ethnic group and speak the Uzbek language, one of the family of Turkic languages.

Uzbekistan was incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 19th century and in 1924 became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union, known as the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Uzbek SSR). It has been an independent republic since December 1991.

Uzbekistan's economy relies mainly on commodity production, including cotton, gold, uranium, potassium, and natural gas. Despite the declared objective of transition to a market economy, Uzbekistan continues to maintain rigid economic controls, which often repel foreign investors. The policy of gradual, strictly controlled transition has nevertheless produced beneficial results in the form of economic recovery after 1995. Uzbekistan's domestic policies on human rights and individual freedoms are often criticised by international organizations.

Geography

Uzbekistan has an area of . It is the 56th largest country in the world by area and the 42nd by population. Among the CIS countries, it is the 5th largest by area and the 3rd largest by population.

Uzbekistan lies between latitudes 37° and 46° N, and longitudes 56° and 74° E. It stretches from west to east and from north to south. Bordering Kazakhstan and the Aral Sea to the north and northwest, Turkmenistan to the southwest, Tajikistan to the southeast, and Kyrgyzstan to the northeast, Uzbekistan is not only one of the larger Central Asian states but also the only Central Asian state to border all the other four. Uzbekistan also shares a short border (less than ) with Afghanistan to the south.

Uzbekistan is a dry, landlocked country; it is one of two doubly landlocked countries in the world, i.e., a country completely surrounded by landlocked countries – the other being Liechtenstein. Less than 10% of its territory is intensively cultivated irrigated land in river valleys and oases. The rest is vast desert (Kyzyl Kum) and mountains.

The highest point in Uzbekistan is the Khazret Sultan, located at above sea level, located in the southern part of the Gissar Range in Surkhandarya Province, on the border with Tajikistan, just north-west of Dushanbe (formerly called ''Peak of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party'').

The climate in the Republic of Uzbekistan is continental, with little precipitation expected annually (100–200 millimeters, or 3.9–7.9 inches). The average summer high temperature tends to be 40 °C , while the average winter low temperature is around −23 °C .

Major cities include Andijan, Bukhara, Samarkand, Namangan and the capital Tashkent.

Environment

Decades of questionable Soviet policies in pursuit of greater cotton production have resulted in a catastrophic scenario. The agricultural industry appears to be the main contributor to the pollution and devastation of the air and water in the country.

The Aral Sea disaster is a classic example. The Aral Sea used to be the fourth-largest inland sea on Earth, acting as an influencing factor in the air moisture. Since the 1960s, the decade when the misuse of the Aral Sea water began, it has shrunk to less than 50% of its former area and decreased in volume threefold. Reliable or even approximate data have not been collected, stored or provided by any organisation or official agency. Much of the water was and still continues to be used for the irrigation of cotton fields, a crop that requires a large amount of water to grow.

The numbers of animal deaths and human refugees from the area around the sea can only be guessed at. The question of who is responsible for the crisis remains open – the Soviet scientists and politicians who directed the distribution of water during the 1960s, or the post-Soviet politicians who did not allocate sufficient funding for the building of dams and irrigation systems.

Due to the virtually insoluble Aral Sea problem, high salinity and contamination of the soil with heavy elements are especially widespread in Karakalpakstan, the region of Uzbekistan adjacent to the Aral Sea. The bulk of the nation's water resources is used for farming, which accounts for nearly 94% of the water usage and contributes to high soil salinity.

The first people known to inhabit Central Asia were Iranian nomads who arrived from the northern grasslands of what is now Uzbekistan sometime in the first millennium BC. These nomads, who spoke Iranian dialects, settled in Central Asia and began to build an extensive irrigation system along the rivers of the region. At this time, cities such as Bukhoro (Bukhara) and Samarqand (Samarkand) began to appear as centers of government and culture. By the 5th century BC, the Bactrian, Soghdian, and Tokharian states dominated the region.

As China began to develop its silk trade with the West, Iranian cities took advantage of this commerce by becoming centers of trade. Using an extensive network of cities and settlements in the province of Mawarannahr (a name given the region after the Arab conquest) in Uzbekistan and farther east in what is today China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the Soghdian intermediaries became the wealthiest of these Iranian merchants. Because of this trade on what became known as the Silk Route, Bukhoro and Samarqand eventually became extremely wealthy cities, and at times Mawarannahr was one of the most influential and powerful Persian provinces of antiquity.

Alexander the Great conquered Sogdiana and Bactria in 327 BC, marrying Roxana, daughter of a local Bactrian chieftain. The conquest was supposedly of little help to Alexander as popular resistance was fierce, causing Alexander's army to be bogged down in the region that became the northern part of Hellenistic Greco-Bactrian Kingdom. For many centuries the region of Uzbekistan was ruled by Persian empires, including the Parthian and Sassanid Empires.

In the 8th century Transoxiana (territory between the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers) was conquered by Arabs.

In the 9th – 10th centuries Transoxiana was included into Samanid State.

The Mongol conquest under Genghis Khan during the 13th century, would bring about a dramatic change to the region. The brutal conquest and widespread genocide characteristic of the Mongols almost entirely exterminated the indigenous Indo-Persian (Scythian) people of the region, their culture and heritage being superseded by that of the Mongolian-Turkic peoples who settled the region thereafter.

Following the death of Genghis Khan in 1227, his empire was divided among his four sons and his family members. Despite the potential for serious fragmentation, Mongol law of the Mongol Empire maintained orderly succession for several more generations, and control of most of Mawarannahr stayed in the hands of direct descendants of Chagatai Khan, the second son of Genghis Khan. Orderly succession, prosperity, and internal peace prevailed in the Chaghatai lands, and the Mongol Empire as a whole remained strong and united.

In the early fourteenth century, however, as the empire began to break up into its constituent parts, the Chaghatai territory also was disrupted as the princes of various tribal groups competed for influence. One tribal chieftain, Timur (Tamerlane), emerged from these struggles in the 1380s as the dominant force in Mawarannahr. Although he was not a descendant of Chinggis, Timur became the de facto ruler of Mawarannahr and proceeded to conquer all of western Central Asia, Iran, Asia Minor, and the southern steppe region north of the Aral Sea. He also invaded Russia and India before dying during an invasion of China in 1405.

Timur initiated the last flowering of Mawarannahr by gathering in his capital, Samarqand, numerous artisans and scholars from the lands he had conquered. By supporting such people, Timur imbued his empire with a very rich culture. During Timur's reign and the reigns of his immediate descendants, a wide range of religious and palatial construction projects were undertaken in Samarqand and other population centres. Timur also initiated exchange of medical thoughts and patronized physicians, scientists and artists from the neighboring countries like India.; his grandson Ulugh Beg was one of the world's first great astronomers. It was during the Timurid dynasty that Turkish, in the form of the Chaghatai dialect, became a literary language in its own right in Mawarannahr—although the Timurids also patronized writing in Persian. Until then only Persian had been used in the region. The greatest Chaghataid writer, Ali-Shir Nava'i, was active in the city of Herat, now in northwestern Afghanistan, in the second half of the fifteenth century.

The Timurid state quickly broke into two halves after the death of Timur. The chronic internal fighting of the Timurids attracted the attention of the Uzbek nomadic tribes living to the north of the Aral Sea. In 1501 the Uzbeks began a wholesale invasion of Mawarannahr. The slave trade in the Khanate of Bukhara became prominent and was firmly established. Estimates from 1821 suggest that between 25,000 and 40,000 Persian slaves were working in Bukhara at the time.

In the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire began to expand and spread into Central Asia. By 1912, Russians living in Uzbekistan numbered 210,306. The "Great Game" period is generally regarded as running from approximately 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a second, less intensive phase followed. At the start of the nineteenth century, there were some 2,000 miles (3,200 km) separating British India and the outlying regions of Tsarist Russia. Much of the land in between was unmapped.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Central Asia was firmly in the hands of Russia and, despite some early resistance to Bolsheviks, Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia became a part of the Soviet Union. On October 27, 1924 the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was created. On August 31, 1991, Uzbekistan declared independence, marking September 1 as a national holiday.

The country is now the world's third-largest exporter of cotton, and it is developing its mineral and petroleum reserves.

Politics

The first elections of the Oliy Majlis (Parliament) were held under a resolution adopted by the 16th Supreme Soviet in 1994. In that year, the Supreme Soviet was replaced by the Oliy Majlis. Since then Uzbekistan has held presidential and parliamentarian elections on regular basis but no real opposition candidates or parties are able to participate.

The third elections for the bicameral 150-member Oliy Majlis — the Legislative Chamber and the 100-member Senate — for five-year terms, were held on December 27, 2009, after the second elections that were held in December 2004–2005. The Oliy Majlis was unicameral up to 2004. Its strength increased from 69 deputies (members) in 1994 to 120 in 2004–05 and presently to 150.

The executive holds a great deal of power, and the legislature has little power to shape laws. Under terms of a December 27, 1995 referendum, Islam Karimov's first term was extended. Another national referendum was held January 27, 2002 to extend the Constitutional Presidential term from 5 years to 7 years.

The referendum passed, and Karimov's term was extended by an act of parliament to December 2007. Most international observers refused to participate in the process and did not recognize the results, dismissing them as not meeting basic standards. The 2002 referendum also included a plan to create a bicameral parliament, consisting of a lower house (the Oliy Majlis) and an upper house (Senate). Members of the lower house are to be "full time" legislators. Elections for the new bicameral parliament took place on December 26, but no truly independent opposition candidates or parties were able to take part.

The OSCE limited observation mission concluded that the elections fell significantly short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. Several political parties have been formed with government approval. Similarly, although multiple media outlets (radio, TV, newspaper) have been established, these either remain under government control or rarely broach political topics. Independent political parties were allowed to organise, recruit members and hold conventions and press conferences, but they have been denied registration under restrictive registration procedures.

Human rights

The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan asserts that "democracy in the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be based upon common human principles, according to which the highest value shall be the human being, his life, freedom, honour, dignity and other inalienable rights."

However, non-governmental human rights watchdogs, such as IHF, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, as well as United States Department of State and Council of the European Union define Uzbekistan as "an authoritarian state with limited civil rights" and express profound concern about "wide-scale violation of virtually all basic human rights". According to the reports, the most widespread violations are torture, arbitrary arrests, and various restrictions of freedoms: of religion, of speech and press, of free association and assembly. The reports maintain that the violations are most often committed against members of religious organizations, independent journalists, human rights activists and political activists, including members of the banned opposition parties. In 2005, Uzbekistan was included into Freedom House's "The Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies."

The official position is summarised in a memorandum "The measures taken by the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the field of providing and encouraging human rights" and amounts to the following: the government does everything that is in its power to protect and to guarantee the human rights of Uzbekistan's citizens. Uzbekistan continuously improves its laws and institutions in order to create a more humane society. Over 300 laws regulating the rights and basic freedoms of the people have been passed by the parliament. For instance, an office of Ombudsman was established in 1996. On August 2, 2005, President Islam Karimov signed a decree that was to abolish capital punishment in Uzbekistan on January 1, 2008.

The 2005 civil unrest in Uzbekistan, which resulted in several hundred people being killed, is viewed by many as a landmark event in the history of human rights abuse in Uzbekistan, A concern has been expressed and a request for an independent investigation of the events has been made by the United States, European Union, the UN, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The government of Uzbekistan is accused of unlawful termination of human life and of denying its citizens freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. The government vehemently rebuffs the accusations, maintaining that it merely conducted an anti-terrorist operation, exercising only necessary force. In addition, some officials claim that "an information war on Uzbekistan has been declared" and the human rights violations in Andijan are invented by the enemies of Uzbekistan as a convenient pretext for intervention into the country's internal affairs.

Uzbekistan also does not allow Tajiks to teach their youth in their native language. There have been cases of destroying Tajiki (Persian-language) literary works.

Provinces and districts

Uzbekistan is divided into twelve provinces (''viloyatlar'', singular ''viloyat'', compound noun ''viloyati'' e.g., Toshkent ''viloyati'', Samarqand ''viloyati'', etc.), one autonomous republic (''respublika'', compound noun ''respublikasi'' e.g. Qaraqalpaqstan Avtonom ''Respublikasi'', Karakalpakistan ''Autonomous Republic'', etc.), and one independent city (''shahar''. compound noun ''shahri'', e.g., Toshkent ''shahri''). Names are given below in the Uzbek language, although numerous variations of the transliterations of each name exist.

Division !! Capital City!! Area(km²)!! Population (2008)!! Key
Buxoro Province>Buxoro Viloyati	Buxoro (Bukhara)	39,400	1,576,800
Jizzax Province	Jizzax Viloyati	Jizzax	20,500	1,090,900
Navoiy Province	Navoiy Viloyati	Navoiy	110,800	834,100
Qashqadaryo Province	Qashqadaryo Viloyati	Qarshi	28,400	2,537,600
Samarqand Province	Samarqand Viloyati	Samarqand	16,400	3,032,000
Sirdaryo Province	Sirdaryo Viloyati	Guliston	5,100	698,100
Surxondaryo Province	Surxondaryo Viloyati	Termiz	20,800	2,012,600
Tashkent Province	Toshkent Viloyati	Toshkent (Tashkent)	15,300	2,537,500
Tashkent	Toshkent Shahri	Toshkent (Tashkent)	???	2,192,700
Fergana Valley Region
Fergana Province	Farg'ona Viloyati	Farg'ona (Fergana)	6,800	2,997,400
Andijan Province	Andijon Viloyati	Andijon	4,200	2,477,900
Namangan Province	Namangan Viloyati	Namangan	7,900	2,196,200
Karakalpakstan Region
Xorazm Province	Xorazm Viloyati	Urganch	6,300	1,517,600
Karakalpakstan	Qaraqalpaqstan Respublikasi	Nukus	160,000	1,612,300

The statistics for Toshkent Viloyati also include the statistics for Toshkent Shahri.

The provinces are further divided into districts (''tuman'').

Economy

Along with many Commonwealth of Independent States economies, Uzbekistan's economy declined during the first years of transition and then recovered after 1995, as the cumulative effect of policy reforms began to be felt. It has shown robust growth, rising by 4% per year between 1998 and 2003 and accelerating thereafter to 7%–8% per year. According to IMF estimates, the GDP in 2008 will be almost double its value in 1995 (in constant prices). Since 2003 annual inflation rates averaged less than 10%.

Uzbekistan has a very low GNI per capita (US$610 in current dollars in 2006, giving a PPP equivalent of US$2,250). By GNI per capita in PPP equivalents Uzbekistan ranks 169 among 209 countries; among the 12 CIS countries, only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had lower GNI per capita in 2006. Economic production is concentrated in commodities: Uzbekistan is now the world's sixth-largest producer and second-largest exporter of cotton, as well as the seventh largest world producer of gold. It is also a regionally significant producer of natural gas, coal, copper, oil, silver and uranium.

Agriculture employs 28% of Uzbekistan's labour force and contributes 24% of its GDP (2006 data). While official unemployment is very low, underemployment – especially in rural areas – is estimated to be at least 20%. Still, at cotton-harvest time, all students and teachers are mobilized and enslaved as unpaid labour to help in the fields. The use of child labour in Uzbekistan has led several companies, including Tesco, C&A, Marks & Spencer, Gap, and H&M, to boycott Uzbek cotton.

Facing a multitude of economic challenges upon acquiring independence, the government adopted an evolutionary reform strategy, with an emphasis on state control, reduction of imports and self-sufficiency in energy. Since 1994, the state-controlled media have repeatedly proclaimed the success of this "Uzbekistan Economic Model" and suggested that it is a unique example of a smooth transition to the market economy while avoiding shock, pauperism and stagnation.

The gradualist reform strategy has involved postponing significant macroeconomic and structural reforms. The state in the hands of the bureaucracy has remained a dominant influence in the economy. Corruption permeates the society and grows more rampant over time: Uzbekistan's 2005 Corruption Perception Index was 137 out of 159 countries, whereas in 2007 Uzbekistan was 175th out of 179 countries. A February 2006 report on the country by the International Crisis Group suggests that revenues earned from key exports, especially cotton, gold, corn and increasingly gas, are distributed among a very small circle of the ruling elite, with little or no benefit for the populace at large.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, "the government is hostile to allowing the development of an independent private sector, over which it would have no control". Thus, the middle class is marginalised economically and, consequently, politically.

The economic policies have repelled foreign investment, which is the lowest per capita in the CIS. For years, the largest barrier to foreign companies entering the Uzbekistan market has been the difficulty of converting currency. In 2003, the government accepted the obligations of Article VIII under the International Monetary Fund. providing for full currency convertibility. However, strict currency controls and the tightening of borders have lessened the effect of this measure.

Uzbekistan experienced rampant inflation of around 1000% per year immediately after independence (1992–1994). Stabilisation efforts implemented with guidance from the IMF paid off. The inflation rates were brought down to 50% in 1997 and then to 22% in 2002. Since 2003 annual inflation rates averaged less than 10%. Tight economic policies in 2004 resulted in a drastic reduction of inflation to 3.8% (although alternative estimates based on the price of a true market basket, put it at 15%). The inflation rates moved up to 6.9% in 2006 and 7.6% in 2007 but have remained in the single-digit range. The government of Uzbekistan restricts foreign imports in many ways, including high import duties. Excise taxes are applied in a highly discriminatory manner to protect locally produced goods. Official tariffs are combined with unofficial, discriminatory charges resulting in total charges amounting to as much as 100 to 150% of the actual value of the product, making imported products virtually unaffordable. Import substitution is an officially declared policy and the government proudly reports a reduction by a factor of two in the volume of consumer goods imported. A number of CIS countries are officially exempt from Uzbekistan import duties.

The Republican Stock Exchange (RSE) 'Tashkent' opened in 1994. It houses a securities exchange, real estate traders, the national investment fund and the national securities depositary. It does not trade all joint-stock companies each month, and therefore market capitalisation varies widely.

Uzbekistan's external position has been strong since 2003. Thanks in part to the recovery of world market prices of gold and cotton (the country's key export commodities), expanded natural gas and some manufacturing exports, and increasing labour migrant transfers, the current account turned into a large surplus (between 9% and 11% of GDP from 2003 to 2005) and foreign exchange reserves, including gold, more than doubled to around US$3 billion.

Demographics

Uzbekistan is Central Asia's most populous country. Its 28.1 million people (July 2011 estimate) comprise nearly half the region's total population.

The population of Uzbekistan is very young: 34.1% of its people are younger than 14 (2008 estimate). According to official sources, Uzbeks comprise a majority (80%) of the total population. Other ethnic groups include Russians 5.5%, Tajiks 5%(official estimate and disputed), Kazakhs 3%, Karakalpaks 2.5% and Tatars 1.5% (1996 estimates).

There is some controversy about the percentage of the Tajik population. While official state numbers from Uzbekistan put the number at 5%, the number is said to be an understatement and some Western scholars put the number up to 20%–30%. The Uzbeks absorbed, among others, the Sarts, a Turko-Persian population of Central Asian peasants and merchants. According to recent genetic genealogy testing from a University of Oxford study, the genetic admixture of the Uzbeks clusters somewhere between the Mongols and the Iranian peoples.

Uzbekistan has an ethnic Korean population that was forcibly relocated to the region by Stalin from the Soviet Far East in 1937–1938. There are also small groups of Armenians in Uzbekistan, mostly in Tashkent and Samarkand. The nation is 88% Muslim (mostly Sunni, with a 5% Shi'a minority), 9% Eastern Orthodox and 3% other faiths. The U.S. State Department's International Religious Freedom Report 2004 reports that 0.2% of the population are Buddhist (these being ethnic Koreans). The Bukharan Jews have lived in Central Asia, mostly in Uzbekistan, for thousands of years. There were 94,900 Jews in Uzbekistan in 1989 (about 0.5% of the population according to the 1989 census), but now, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most Central Asian Jews left the region for the United States or Israel. Fewer than 5,000 Jews remained in Uzbekistan in 2007.

During the Soviet period, Russians and Ukrainians constituted more than half the population of Tashkent. The country counted nearly 1.5 million Russians, 12.5% of the population, in the 1970 census. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, significant emigration of ethnic Russians has taken place, mostly for economic reasons.

In the 1940s, the Crimean Tatars, along with the Germans, Chechens, Greeks, Turks, Kurds and many other nationalities were deported to Central Asia. Approximately 100,000 Crimean Tatars continue to live in Uzbekistan. The number of Greeks in Tashkent has decreased from 35,000 in 1974 to about 12,000 today. The majority of Meskhetian Turks left Uzbekistan after 1989.

At least 10% of Uzbekistan's labour force works abroad (mostly in Russia and Kazakhstan).

Uzbekistan has a 99.3% literacy rate among adults older than 15 (2003 estimate), which is attributable to the free and universal education system of the Soviet Union.

Religion

Islam is by far the dominant religion in Uzbekistan, as Muslims constitute 90% of the population while 5% of the population follow Russian Orthodox Christianity, and 5% of the population follow other religion according to a 2009 US State Department release. However, a 2009 Pew Research Center report stated that Uzbekistan's population is 96.3% Muslim. An estimated 93,000 Jews were once present in the country.

Despite its predominance, the practice of Islam is far from monolithic. Many versions of the faith have been practiced in Uzbekistan. The conflict of Islamic tradition with various agendas of reform or secularisation throughout the 20th century has left the outside world with a confused notion of Islamic practices in Central Asia.

In Uzbekistan the end of Soviet power did not bring an upsurge of fundamentalism, as many had predicted, but rather a gradual reacquaintance with the precepts of the faith. However after 2000, there seems to be a rise of support in favour of the Islamists.

Although constitutionally maintaining rights to freedom of religion, Uzbekistan maintains a ban on all religious activities not approved by that state, with particularly harsh treatment of Protestant Christians being commonplace. See: Human Rights; Freedom of Religion, Uzbekistan

Languages

The Uzbek language is the only official state language, and since 1992 is officially written in latin alphabet. The Tajik language is widespread in the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand because of their relatively large population of ethnic Tajiks.

Russian is an important language for interethnic communication, especially in the cities, including much day-to-day technical, scientific, governmental and business use. Russian is the main language of over 14% of the population and is spoken as a second language by many more. The use of Russian in remote rural areas has always been limited, and today school children have no proficiency in Russian even in urban centres. However, it was reported in 2003 that over half of the population could speak Russian, and a renewed close political relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan have meant that official discouragement of Russian has dropped off sharply.

In 1992 Uzbekistan officially shifted back to Latin script, but many signs and notices (including official government boards in the streets) are still written in Uzbek Cyrillic script that had been used in Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic since 1940. Computers as a rule operate using the "Uzbek Cyrillic" keyboard, and Latin script is reportedly composed using the standard English keyboard.

Communications

According to the official source report, as of March 10, 2008, the number of cellular phone users in Uzbekistan reached 7 million, up from 3.7 million on July 1, 2007. The largest mobile operator in terms of number of subscribers is MTS-Uzbekistan (former Uzdunrobita and part of Russian Mobile TeleSystems) and it is followed by Beeline (part of Russia's Beeline) and UCell (ex Coscom) (originally part of the U.S. MCT Corp., now a subsidiary of the Nordic/Baltic telecommunication company TeliaSonera AB).

As of July 1, 2007, the estimated number of internet users was 1.8 million, according to UzACI.

Transportation

Tashkent, the nation's capital and largest city, has a three-line rapid transit system built in 1977, and expanded in 2001 after ten years' independence from the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan is currently the only country in Central Asia with a subway system, which is promoted as one of the cleanest systems in the former Soviet Union. The stations are exceedingly ornate. For example, the station ''Metro Kosmonavtov'' built in 1984 is decorated using a space travel theme to recognise the achievements of mankind in space exploration and to commemorate the role of Vladimir Dzhanibekov, the Soviet cosmonaut of Uzbek origin. A statue of Vladimir Dzhanibekov stands near one of the station's entrances.

There are government-operated trams, buses and trolley buses running across the city. There are also many taxis, both registered and unregistered. Uzbekistan has car-producing plants which produce modern cars. The car production is supported by the government and the Korean auto company Daewoo. The Uzbek government acquired a 50% stake in Daewoo in 2005 for an undisclosed sum, and in May 2007 UzDaewooAuto, the car maker, signed a strategic agreement with General Motors-Daewoo Auto and Technology (GMDAT, see: GM Uzbekistan also). The government also bought a stake in Turkey's Koc in SamKochAvto, a producer of small buses and lorries. Afterwards, it signed an agreement with Isuzu Motors of Japan to produce Isuzu buses and lorries.

Train links connect many towns within Uzbekistan, as well as neighboring former republics of the Soviet Union. Moreover, after independence two fast-running train systems were established. There is also a large airplane plant that was built during the Soviet era – Tashkent Chkalov Aviation Manufacturing Plant or ТАПОиЧ in Russian. The plant originated during World War II, when production facilities were evacuated south and east to avoid capture by advancing Nazi forces. Until the late 1980s, the plant was one of the leading airplane production centers in the USSR, but with dissolution of the Soviet Union its manufacturing equipment became outdated, and most of the workers were laid off. Now it produces only a few planes a year, but with interest from Russian companies growing in it, there are rumours of production-enhancement plans.

Military

Uzbekistan possesses the largest military force in the Central Asian region having around 65,000 people in uniform. Its structure was inherited from the Soviet Armed Forces' Turkestan Military District, although it is moving toward a fully restructured organisation, which is to be based on motor rifle troops (motorised infantry) with some light and Special Forces. The Uzbek Armed Forces' equipment is not modern, and training, while improving, is neither uniform nor adequate for its new mission of territorial security.

The government has accepted the arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union, acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (as a non-nuclear state), and supported an active program by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in western Uzbekistan (Nukus and Vozrozhdeniye Island). The Government of Uzbekistan spends about 3.7% of GDP on the military but has received a growing infusion of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and other security assistance funds since 1998.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., Uzbekistan approved the U.S. Central Command's request for access to an air base, the Karshi-Khanabad airfield, in southern Uzbekistan. However Uzbekistan demanded that the U.S. withdraw from the airbases after the Andijan massacre and the U.S. reaction to this massacre. The last US troops left Uzbekistan in November 2005.

Foreign relations

Uzbekistan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991. However, it is opposed to reintegration and withdrew from the CIS collective security arrangement in 1999. Since that time, Uzbekistan has participated in the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan and in UN-organized groups to help resolve the Tajikistan and Afghanistan conflicts, both of which it sees as posing threats to its own stability.

Previously close to Washington (which gave Uzbekistan half a billion dollars in aid in 2004, about a quarter of its military budget), the government of Uzbekistan has recently restricted American military use of the airbase at Karshi-Khanabad for air operations in neighboring Afghanistan. Uzbekistan was an active supporter of U.S. efforts against worldwide terrorism and joined the coalitions that have dealt with both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The relationship between Uzbekistan and the United States began to deteriorate after the so-called "colour revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine (and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan). When the U.S. joined in a call for an independent international investigation of the bloody events at Andijon, the relationship took an additional nosedive, and President Islam Karimov changed the political alignment of the country to bring it closer to Russia and China, countries which chose not to criticise Uzbekistan's leaders for their alleged human rights violations.

In late July 2005, the government of Uzbekistan ordered the United States to vacate an air base in Karshi-Kanabad (near Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan) within 180 days. Karimov had offered use of the base to the U.S. shortly after 9/11. It is also believed by some Uzbeks that the protests in Andijan were brought about by the U.K. and U.S. influences in the area of Andijan. This is another reason for the hostility between Uzbekistan and the West.

Uzbekistan is a member of the United Nations (UN) (since March 2, 1992), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It belongs to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) (comprising the five Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). In 1999, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), which was formed in 1997 (making it GUUAM), but pulled out of the organization in 2005.

Uzbekistan is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and hosts the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. Uzbekistan joined the new Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) in 2002. The CACO consists of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is a founding member of, and remains involved in, the Central Asian Union, formed with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and joined in March 1998 by Tajikistan.

In September 2006, UNESCO presented Islam Karimov an award for Uzbekistan's preservation of its rich culture and traditions. Despite criticism, this seems to be a sign of improving relationships between Uzbekistan and the West.

The month of October 2006 also saw a decrease in the isolation of Uzbekistan from the West. The EU announced that it was planning to send a delegation to Uzbekistan to talk about human rights and liberties, after a long period of hostile relations between the two. Although it is equivocal about whether the official or unofficial version of the Andijan Massacre is true, the EU is evidently willing to ease its economic sanctions against Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed among Uzbekistan's population that the government will stand firm in maintaining its close ties with the Russian Federation and in its theory that the 2004–2005 protests in Uzbekistan were promoted by the USA and UK.

Culture

Uzbekistan has a wide mix of ethnic groups and cultures, with the Uzbek being the majority group. In 1995 about 71% of Uzbekistan's population was Uzbek. The chief minority groups were Russians (8%), Tajiks (5–30%), Kazaks (4%), Tatars (2.5%) and Karakalpaks (2%). It is said, however, that the number of non-Uzbek people living in Uzbekistan is decreasing as Russians and other minority groups slowly leave and Uzbeks return from other parts of the former Soviet Union.

When Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991, there was concern that Muslim fundamentalism would spread across the region. The expectation was that a country long denied freedom of religious practice would undergo a very rapid increase in the expression of its dominant faith. As of 1994, well over half of Uzbekistan's population was said to be Muslim, though in an official survey few of that number had any real knowledge of the religion or knew how to practice it. However, Islamic observance is increasing in the region.

Uzbekistan has a high literacy rate, with about 99.3% of adults above the age of 15 being able to read and write. However with only 88% of the under-15 population currently enrolled in education, this figure may drop in the future . Uzbekistan has encountered severe budgeting shortfalls in its education program. The education law of 1992 began the process of theoretical reform, but the physical base has deteriorated and curriculum revision has been slow.

Uzbekistan's universities create almost 600,000 graduates annually.

Music

Central Asian classical music is called Shashmaqam, which arose in Bukhara in the late 16th century when that city was a regional capital. Shashmaqam is closely related to Azerbaijani Mugam and Uyghur muqam. The name, which translates as ''six maqams'' refers to the structure of the music, which contains six sections in six different Musical modes, similar to classical Persian traditional music. Interludes of spoken Sufi poetry interrupt the music, typically beginning at a lower register and gradually ascending to a climax before calming back down to the beginning tone.

Endurance of listening and continual audiences that attend events, such as Bazms or Weddings, is what makes the Folk-pop style of music so popular. The classical music in Uzbekistan is very different than that of the pop music. Mostly men listen to Solo or Duo shows during a morning or evening meeting amongst men. Shash maqam, which is the main component of the classical genre of music. The large support of the musicians from high class families, which meant the Patronage was to be paid to the Shash maqam above all things. Poetry is where some of the music is drawn from. In some instances of the music, the 2 languages are even mixed in the same song. In the 1950s, the folk music became less popular, and the genre was barred from the radio stations. They did not completely dispel the music all together, although the name changed to ''Feudal music''. Although banned, the folk musical groups continued to play their music in their own ways and spread it individually as well. Many say that it was the most liberated musical experience in their lives.

Education

Uzbekistan has a high Literacy rate with about 88% of adults above the age of 15 being able to read and write. However with only 76% of the under 15 population currently enrolled in education this figure may drop in the future. Uzbekistan has encountered severe budgeting shortfalls in its education program. The education law of 1992 began the process of Theoretical reform, but the physical base has deteriorated, and curriculum revision has been slow.

Holidays

January 1 – New Year "Yangi Yil Bayrami"

January 14 – Vatan Himoyachilari kuni

March 8 – International Women's Day – "Xalqaro Xotin-Qizlar kuni"

March 21 – Navrooz – "Navro'z Bayrami"

May 9 – Remembrance Day – "Xotira va Qadirlash kuni"

September 1 – Independence Day – "Mustaqillik kuni"

October 1 – Teacher's Day – "O'qituvchi va Murabbiylar"

December 8 – "Constitution Day" – Konstitutsiya kuni

''Variable date''

End of Ramazon Ramazon Hayit Eid al-Fitr

70 days later Qurbon Hayit Eid al-Adha

Cuisine

''Uzbek Cuisine'' is influenced by local agriculture, as in most nations. There is a great deal of grain farming in Uzbekistan, so breads and noodles are of importance and Uzbek cuisine has been characterized as ''noodle rich''. Mutton is a popular variety of meat due to the abundance of sheep in the country and it is part of various Uzbek dishes.

Uzbekistan's signature dish is Palov (''Plov'' or '' Osh''), a main course typically made with rice, pieces of meat, and grated carrots and onions. ''Oshi Nahor'' or morning ''Plov'', is served in the early morning (between 6 and 9 am) to large gatherings of guests, typically as part of an ongoing wedding celebration. Other notable national dishes include: Shurpa (''Shurva'' or ''Shorva''), a soup made of large pieces of fatty meat (usually mutton), and fresh vegetables; Norin and Langman, noodle-based dishes that may be served as a soup or a main course; Manti, Chuchvara, and Somsa, stuffed pockets of dough served as an appetizer or a main course; Dimlama (a meat and vegetable stew) and various Kebabs, usually served as a main course.

Green tea is the national hot beverage taken throughout the day; teahouses (''Chaikhanas'') are of cultural importance. The more usual black tea is preferred in Tashkent, both green and black teas are taken daily without milk or sugar. Tea always accompanies a meal, but it is also a drink of hospitality, automatically offered-green or black-to every guest. Ayran, a chilled yogurt drink, is popular in summer, but does not replace hot tea.

The use of alcohol is less widespread than in the west, but wine is comparatively popular for a Muslim nation as Uzbekistan is largely secular. Uzbekistan has 14 wineries, the oldest and most famous being the Khovrenko Winery in Samarkand (est. 1927). The Samarkand Winery produces a range of dessert wines from local grape varieties: Gulyakandoz, Shirin, Aleatiko, and Kabernet likernoe (literally Cabernet dessert wine in Russian). Uzbek wines have received international awards and are exported to Russia and other countries.

Sport

Uzbekistan is home to former racing cyclist Djamolidine Abdoujaparov. Abdoujaparov has won the points contest in the Tour de France three times, each time winning the coveted green jersey. (The green jersey is second only to the yellow jersey.) Abdoujaparov was a specialist at winning stages in tours or one-day races when the bunch or peloton would finish together. He would often 'sprint' in the final kilometre and had a reputation as being dangerous in these bunch sprints as he would weave from side to side. This reputation earned him the nickname 'The Terror of Tashkent'.

Artur Taymazov won Uzbekistan's first wrestling medal at the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, as well as two gold medals at both the 2004 and 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Men's 120 kg.

Ruslan Chagaev is a professional boxer representing Uzbekistan in the WBA. He won the WBA champion title in 2007 after defeating Russian Nikolai Valuev. Chagaev defended his title twice before losing it to Vladimir Klitschko in 2009.

Michael Kolganov, sprint canoer, was world champion and won an Olympic bronze in K-1 500-meter. Gymnast Alexander Shatilov won a world bronze as an artistic gymnast in floor exercise.

Uzbekistan is the home of the International Kurash Association. Kurash is an internationalized and modernized form of the traditional Uzbek fighting art of Kurash.

Football is the most popular sport in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's premier football league is the Uzbek League which features 16 teams. The current champions are FC Bunyodkor, and the team with the most championships is FC Pakhtakor Tashkent with 8. The current player of the year is Odil Ahmedov. Uzbekistan regularly participates in the AFC Champions League and the AFC Cup.

Before Uzbekistan's independence in 1991, the country used to be part of the Soviet Union national football, rugby, ice hockey, basketball, and handball teams. After Uzbekistan split from the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan created its own rugby, football, and futsal national teams.

Rugby, handball, baseball, ice hockey, basketball, and futsal are becoming popular sports in Uzbekistan.

Gallery

See also

Notes

References

Sources

Environmental Justice Foundation, February 2010, Slave Nation – A report exposing the continued use of state-sponsored forced child labour in the cotton fields of Uzbekistan,

Anora Mahmudova, AlterNet, May 27, 2005, Uzbekistan’s Growing Police State (checked 2005-11-08)

Manfred Nowak, Radio Free Europe, 2005-06-23, UN Charges Uzbekistan With Post-Andijon Torture,

Gulnoza Saidazimova, Radio Free Europe, 2005-06-22, Uzbekistan: Tashkent reveals findings on Andijon uprising as victims mourned

BBC News, 'Harassed' BBC shuts Uzbek office, 2005-10-26 (checked 2005-11-15)

CIA – The World Factbook — Uzbekistan

OMCT ">Denial of Justice in Uzbekistan, report to OMCT

The worst of the worst, the world's most repressive societies, 2005.

The measures, taken by the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the field of providing and encouraging human rights

Uzbekistan's Ombudsman reports on 2002 results

Jeffrey Thomas, US Government Info September 26, 2005 Freedom of Assembly, Association Needed in Eurasia, U.S. Says,

Robert McMahon, Radio Free Europe, 2005-06-07 Uzbekistan: Report Cites Evidence Of Government 'Massacre' In Andijon

Amnesty International, public statement "Uzbekistan: Independent international investigation needed into Andizhan events"

People's Voice, 2005-05-17 Andijan events: truth and lies

Interview with Akmal Saidov, kreml.org, 2005-10-17 Andijon events are used as a pretext for putting an unprecedented pressure on Uzbekistan

Worldbank per-country data on GNI and PPP per capita

UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Country Report on Uzbekistan

Islam Karimov's interview to Rossijskaya Gazeta, 1995-07-07 Principles of Our Reform

2005 Index of Economic Freedom, Uzbekistan

US Department of State, Uzbekistan: 2005 Investment Climate Statement

The Republic of Uzbekistan Accepts Article VIII Obligations

UNDP/CER/CCI's Public-Private Partnership in Uzbekistan: Problems, Opportunities and Ways of Introduction

UNDP & Chamber of Commerce and Industry “Export Guide for Uzbekistan”

US Department of State, 2005–07 Background Note: Uzbekistan

Asian Development Outlook for 2005, report on Uzbekistan

IMF, 2005-09-24 Republic of Uzbekistan and the IMF

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan report on International Trade

Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul: report on the international response to Uzbekistan by the International Crisis Group

On results of socio-economic development of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the first half of 2009

Aral Sea Foundation

Printed sources

''Chasing the Sea: Lost Among the Ghosts of Empire in Central Asia'' by Tom Bissell

''A Historical Atlas of Uzbekistan'' by Aisha Khan

''The Modern Uzbeks From the 14th century to the Present: A Cultural History'' by Edward A. Allworth

''Nationalism in Uzbekistan: Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty'' by James Critchlow

''Odyssey Guide: Uzbekistan'' by Calcum Macleod and Bradley Mayhew

''Uzbekistan: Heirs to the Silk Road'' by Johannes Kalter and Margareta Pavaloi

''Silk Road to Ruin: Is Central Asia the New Middle East?'' by Ted Rall

''Murder in Samarkand – A British Ambassador's Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror'' by Craig Murray

''Tamerlane's Children – Dispatches from contemporary Uzbekistan'' by Robert Rand

''White Gold – the true cost of cotton'', ''Still in the Fields'', ''Slave Nation'' printed reports documenting environmental and social abuses in Uzbekistan's cotton fields by the Environmental Justice Foundation

External links

Tashkent directory

Lower House of Uzbekistan parliament

Upper House of Uzbekistan parliament

Chief of State and Cabinet Members

; General information

Uzbekistan from the U.S. Library of Congress includes Background Notes, Country Study and major reports

Uzbek Publishing and National Bibliography from the University of Illinois Slavic and East European Library

Uzbekistan at ''UCB Libraries GovPubs''

Category:Central Asian countries Category:Modern Turkic states Category:Landlocked countries Category:Russian-speaking countries and territories Category:States and territories established in 1991 Category:Member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Category:Member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States Category:Member states of the United Nations

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Coordinates	41°52′55″N87°37′40″N
Name	Hu Jintao
Office	6th General Secretary of the Communist Party of China
Deputy
Term start	15 November 2002
Term end
Predecessor	Jiang Zemin
Office2	President of the People's Republic of China
Premier2	Wen Jiabao
Vicepresident2	Zeng QinghongXi Jinping
Term start2	15 March 2003
Term end2
Predecessor2	Jiang Zemin
Office3	Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission
Deputy3	Xi JinpingGuo BoxiongXu Caihou
Term start3	19 September 2004
Predecessor3	Jiang Zemin
Office4	Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission
Deputy4	Xi JinpingGuo BoxiongXu Caihou
Term start4	13 March 2005
Predecessor4	Jiang Zemin
Office5	Member of theNational People's Congress
Constituency5	Guizhou At-large (88-93,98-03)Tibet At-large (93-98,03-08)Zhejiang At-large (08-)
Term start5	6 June 1988
Office6	6th Vice President of the People's Republic of China
President6	Jiang Zemin
Term start6	15 March 1998
Term end6	15 March 2003
Predecessor6	Rong Yiren
Successor6	Zeng Qinghong
Birth date	December 21, 1942
Birth place	Jiangyan, Jiangsu Province China
Party	Communist Party of China
Spouse	Liu Yongqing
Children	Hu HaifengHu Haiqing
Residence	Zhongnanhai
Alma mater	Tsinghua University
Profession	Hydraulic engineer
Signature	Hu Jintao Sign.png }}

Hu Jintao (Pinyin: Hú Jǐntāo, pronounced ; born 21 December 1942) is the current Paramount Leader of the People's Republic of China. He has held the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since 2002, President of the People's Republic of China since 2003, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2004, succeeding Jiang Zemin as the top leader of fourth generation leadership of the Communist Party of China.

Hu has been involved in the Communist party bureaucracy for most of his adult life, notably as Party secretary for Guizhou province and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then later first Secretary of the CPC Secretariat and Vice-President under former leader Jiang Zemin. Hu is the first leader of the Communist Party without any significant revolutionary credentials. As such, his rise to the presidency represented China's transition of leadership from establishment communists to younger, more pragmatic technocrats.

During his term in office, Hu reintroduced state control in some sectors of the economy that were relaxed by the previous administration, and has been conservative with political reforms. Along with his colleague, Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu presided over nearly a decade of consistent economic growth and development that cemented China as a major world power. He sought to improve socio-economic equality domestically through the Scientific Development Concept, which aimed to build a "Harmonious Society" that was prosperous and free of social conflict. Meanwhile, Hu kept a tight lid on China politically, cracking down on social disturbances, ethnic minority protests, and dissident figures. In foreign policy, Hu advocated for "China's peaceful development", pursuing soft power in international relations and a business-oriented approach to diplomacy. Through Hu's tenure, China's influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing countries has increased.

Hu possesses a low-key and reserved leadership style, and is a firm believer in consensus-based rule. These traits makes Hu a rather bland figure in the public eye, but also represents the focus in Chinese politics on technocratic competence rather than personality. Due to term restrictions, he must step down as General Secretary in 2012 and President in 2013.

Early life

Hu Jintao was born in Taizhou, Jiangsu on 21 December 1942. His branch of the family migrated from Jixi County of Anhui province to Jiangyan during his grandfather's generation. Official records therefore describe him as a native of Jixi without mention of Jiangsu.

Though his father owned a small tea trading business in Taizhou, the family was relatively poor. His mother died when he was seven, and he was raised by an aunt. Hu's father was later denounced during the Cultural Revolution, an event that (together with his relatively humble origins) apparently had a deep effect upon Hu, who diligently tried to clear his father's name.

Hu was a gifted student in high school, excelling in activities such as singing and dancing. In 1964, while still a student at Beijing's Tsinghua University, Hu joined the Communist Party of China (CPC), before the Cultural Revolution. He was the chairman of Tsinghua Student Union at that time. He graduated in hydraulic engineering in 1965. At Tsinghua, Hu met a fellow student Liu Yongqing, now his wife. They have a son and a daughter named Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing respectively.

In 1968, Hu volunteered for his service in Gansu and worked on the construction of Liujiaxia Hydroelectric Station while also managing Party affairs for the local branch of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. From 1969 to 1974, Hu worked for Sinohydro Engineering Bureau, as an engineer.

Early political career

In 1973, Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of Gansu as a secretary. The next year he was promoted to vice senior chief. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping implemented the "Four Transformations" program, which aimed to produce communist leaders who were "more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more specialized." In response to this nation-wide search for young party members, Song Ping, the first secretary of CPC Gansu Committee (Gansu's governor) discovered Hu Jintao and promoted him several ranks to the position of deputy head of the commission. Another protégé of Song, Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time.

In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth League Gansu Branch Secretary and was appointed as the director of the All-China Youth Federation. His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of Organization of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of senior cadres' recommendation, candidacy and promotion. With the support of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, Hu was assured of a bright future in the party. At Song Ping's suggestion, in 1982 central Party authorities invited Hu to Beijing to study at the Central Party School. Soon after, he was transferred to Beijing and appointed as secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee ("CY Central"). Two years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, thus its actual leader. During his term in the Youth League, Hu escorted Hu Yaobang, who was General Secretary of CPC then, in visits around the country. Hu Yaobang, himself a veteran coming from the Youth League, could reminiscence his youth through Hu's company.

Party Committee Secretary of Guizhou

In 1985, Hu Yaobang pushed for Hu Jintao to be transferred to Guizhou as the provincial Committee Secretary of Communist Party of China. Hu attempted to improve the economy of the backwater province, and reputedly visited all of its eighty-six counties. While in Guizhou, Hu was careful to follow Beijing's directives and had a reputation of being "airtight"; he rarely would offer his views on policy matters in public. While Hu was generally seen as an official with integrity and honesty, some locals preferred his predecessor Zhu Houze. In 1987, Hu Jintao handled the local students protest parallel to the Democracy Wall carefully, whereas in Beijing similar protests resulted in Hu Yaobang's forced resignation.

Tenure in Tibet

The exit of his patron Hu Yaobang from the political scene was initially seen as unfavourable towards Hu Jintao. He drew criticism from party elders for failing to criticize the ousted reformer. In 1988, Hu was transferred to become Party Regional Committee Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the restive area's number-one figure, while also taking on the role of Political Commissar of the local People's Liberation Army units. A number of Tibetans have long been opposed to government policy in the region and unrest and ethnic conflict were brewing, particularly anti-Han Chinese sentiments amongst local Tibetans. Minor clashes had been occurring since 1987, and when the scale of unrest grew, Hu responded with the deployment of some 1,700 People's Armed Police into Lhasa in February 1989 in an attempt to warn against further disturbance. Increased clashes culminated in serious rioting in Lhasa's core on 5 March 1989, five days before the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising. What occurred after is a matter of dispute: rioters accused the police of shooting them arbitrarily, and the police claiming that they had acted in self-defense. In addition, there was speculation that Hu delayed his orders to clamp down on the protesters until late into the evening, when the police chief was forced to act because the situation was spiraling out of control. The protesters were suppressed early into the next day, and Hu asked Beijing to declare martial law on 8 March.

Hu's role in the demonstrations and rioting on March 5 was never made clear. While it is general protocol that Hu must have at least implicitly approved the use of force against protesters, whether he actually gave orders throughout March 5 is a matter of debate. In addition, John Tkacik cites that Hu had been coordinating with the Chengdu Military Region for troops to be on full alert as the situation progressed. Some diplomatic analysts linked what they saw as Hu's brutal use of force to the suppression of activists and students at in Tiananmen Square, which took place a mere three months later. Whether Hu provided "inspiration" for the PLA on June 4 is a matter of debate, but it was clear that Hu's actions in Lhasa earned him unprecedented attention in the upper echelons of party power, including paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. When tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, Hu was one of the first regional leaders to declare his support for the central authorities. Hu experienced high-altitude sickness in June 1990, and returned to Beijing, but remained in his position for another two years, during which Hu achieved little. But his departure to Beijing was seen as a means to return to the centrefold of Chinese politics, which led to some doubts as to whether or not he was as ill as he had claimed.

Candidacy

Before the opening of the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, the Party's senior leaders, including Deng and Chen Yun, were to select candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee to ensure a smooth transition of power from the so-called second-generation leaders (Deng, Chen, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, etc.) to third-generation Communist Party of China leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi etc.). Deng also proposed that they should consider another candidate for a further future transition, preferably someone under fifty to represent the next generation of leaders. Song, as the organization chief, recommended Hu as an ideal candidate for the prospect of a future leader. As a result, shortly before his 50th birthday, Hu Jintao became the youngest member of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, and the second youngest Politburo Standing Committee member ever since the CPC took power in 1949.

In 1993, Hu took charge of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, which oversaw day-to-day operations of the Central Committee, and the Central Party School, which was convenient for him to bring up his own supporters among senior CPC cadres. Hu was also put in charge of the ideological work of the CPC. Although Hu was considered heir apparent to Jiang, he always took great care to ensure that Jiang be at the center of the spotlight. In late 1998, Hu promoted Jiang's unpopular movement of the "Three Stresses" "stress study, stress politics, and stress healthy trends" giving speeches to promote it. In 2001, he publicized Jiang's Three Represents theory, which Jiang hoped to place him on the same level as other Marxist theoreticians. As a result, he left the public with an impression of being low-key, courteous, and adept at forming coalitions. In 1998, Hu became Vice-President of China, and Jiang wanted Hu to play a more active role in foreign affairs. Hu became China's leading voice during the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

Secretaryship and Presidency

Since taking over as Party General Secretary at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed to set up a Harmonious Society which aims at lessening the inequality and changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies. They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been left behind by the economic reform, and have taken a number of high profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao have also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of growth that includes factors in social inequality and environmental damage, including the use of the green gross domestic product in personnel decisions. Jiang's clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas, therefore Hu and Wen's measures of macroeconomic regulation faced great resistance.

SARS crisis

The first crisis of Hu's leadership happened during the outbreak of SARS in 2003. Following strong criticism of China for initially covering up and responding slowly to the crisis, he dismissed several party and government officials, including the health minister, who supported Jiang, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, widely perceived as Hu's protégé. Meng's dismissal was sometimes seen as a yielding compromise to erode Jiang's support in the party. Hu and Wen took steps to increase the transparency of China's reporting to international health organizations, indirectly dealing a blow to Jiang's stance on the issue at hand.

Succession of Jiang Zemin

On 15 November 2002, a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally succeeded Jiang. Although Jiang, then 76, stepped down from the powerful General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger ''fourth generation'' of leadership, there was speculation that Jiang would retain significant influence because Hu was not associated with Jiang's influential ''Shanghai clique'', to which six out of the nine members of the all-powerful Standing Committee were believed to be linked. However, later developments show that many of its members have shifted their positions. Zeng Qinghong, for example, moved from a disciple of Jiang to serving as an intermediary between the two factions. In 2003, Jiang was also re-elected to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, a post from which Deng Xiaoping was able to wield power from behind the scenes as 'paramount leader', thus retaining military power.

Western observers attribute a sense of caution to Hu's philosophies, citing China's recent history of fallen heirs. Deng Xiaoping appointed three party General Secretaries, all designed to be successors, and was instrumental in the ousting of two of them, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. His third and final selection, Jiang Zemin, won Deng's continued, although ambiguous backing and was the only General Secretary in Communist Chinese history to voluntarily leave his post when his term ended.

Although many believe Hu was originally hand-picked by Deng as the youngest member of China's top leadership and a leading candidate to succeed Jiang, he had exercised a great deal of political skills between 1992 and 2002 to consolidate his position, and eventually emerged as Jiang's heir apparent in his own right. Hu also benefited from the slow but progressive institutionalization of power succession within the Party, something his predecessors lacked entirely. Since the early 1980s, the People's Republic of China has been marked by progressive institutionalization and rule by consensus, and moved away from the Maoist authoritarian model. Although a western-style legal institution and rule of law remain to be put in place, Hu's power succession was conducted in a fairly orderly and civil manner, which was unprecedented in Communist China's history. This trend is expected to continue and an institutionalized mechanism of power transition is expected to emerge, first perhaps within the Party. In fact, it has been one of the Party's stated major goals to create an orderly system of succession and mechanism to prevent informal rule and a cult of personality.

The rivalry between Jiang and Hu after Jiang stepped down from his posts was, arguably, an inevitable product of China's tradition of succession. Some analysts argue that although Jiang has consolidated power by the time he retired, his ideological stature within the Communist Party remains shaky at best, thus Jiang had to buy time to ensure that his ideological legacy such as the Three Represents, is enshrined in China's socialism doctrine. Jiang resigned as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, his last official post. Whether this is the result of pressure from Hu or a personal decision is up for speculation. Since then Hu has officially taken on the three institutions in the People's Republic of China where power lie, the party, the state, as well as the military, thus informally, has become the paramount leader.

Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao inherited a China wrought with internal social, political and environmental problems. One of the biggest challenges Hu faces is the large wealth disparity between the Chinese rich and poor, for which discontent and anger mounted to a degree which wreaked havoc on communist rule. Furthermore, the cronyism and corruption plaguing China's civil service, military, educational, judicial and medical systems sought to destroy the country bit by bit. In the beginning of 2006, however, Hu launched the "8 Honours and 8 Disgraces" movement in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population. China's increasingly fragile environment has caused massive urban pollution, sandstorms and the destruction of vast tracts of habitable land. It remains to be seen if Hu, usually cautious in nature, is capable of managing the continued peaceful development of China while avoiding international incidents, at the same time presiding over an unprecedented increase in Chinese nationalist sentiment.

At the 17th CPC National Congress, Hu was re-elected as General Secretary and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission on 22 October 2007. At the 11th National People's Congress, Hu was re-elected as President on 15 March 2008. He was also re-elected as Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission.

''Newsweek'' named Hu the second most powerful person in the world referring to him as "the man behind the wheel of the world's most supercharged economy." ''Forbes'' also named him the second most powerful person in the world. Hu was named the 2010 World's Most Powerful Person by Forbes Magazine. Hu has been listed four times (2008, 2007, 2005 & 2004) on the Time 100 annual list of most influential people.

Political positions

Scientific Perspective and Harmonious Society

Political observers indicate that Hu has distinguished himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. Hu's political philosophy during his presidency is summarized by three slogans — a "Harmonious Society" domestically and "Peaceful Development" internationally, the former aided by the Scientific Development Concept, which seeks integrated sets of solutions to arrays of economic, environmental and social problems, and recognizes, in inner circles, a need for cautious and gradual political reforms. The Scientific Development doctrine has been written into the Communist Party and State Constitutions in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The role of the Party has changed, as formulated by Deng Xiaoping and implemented by Jiang Zemin, from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Hu continues the Party’s modernization, calling for both "Advancement" of the Party and its increasing transparency in governance.

What emerges from these philosophies, in the view of Hu, is a country with systematic approach to national structure and development that combines dynamic economic growth, a free market energized by a vigorous "nonpublic" (i.e., private) sector, heavy-handed political and media control, personal but not political freedoms, concern for the welfare of all citizens, cultural enlightenment, and a synergistic approach to diverse social issues (the Scientific Development Perspective) that lead, in Hu’s vision, to a "Harmonious Society". In the view of the Chinese government, these philosophies, which has created a new "China Model" of governance, serves as a legitimate alternative to the West's "Democracy Model", particularly for developing countries. In Hu’s words, "A harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality." Such a society, he says, will give full scope to people's talent and creativity, enable all the people to share the social wealth brought by reform and development, and forge an ever closer relationship between the people and government.

Western criticism of Hu, particularly regarding human rights, exposes his hypersensitivity to social stability but does not lay as much emphasis on his fresh commitment to address China’s multi-faceted social problems. Hu’s pragmatic, non-ideological agenda has two core values—maintaining social stability to further economic development and sustaining Chinese culture to enrich national sovereignty. In domestic policy, he seems to want more openness to the public on governmental functions and meetings. Recently, China's news agency published many Politburo Standing Committee meeting details. He also cancelled many events that are traditionally seen as communist extravagances, such as the lavish send-off and welcoming-back ceremonies of Chinese leaders when visiting foreign lands. Furthermore the Chinese leadership under Hu has also focused on such problems as the gap between rich and poor and uneven development between the interior and coastal regions. Both party and state seem to have moved away from a definition of development that focuses solely on GDP growth and toward a more balanced definition which includes social equality and environment effects.

In 2004, Hu gave an unprecedented showing and ordered all cadres from the five major power functions to stop the tradition of going to the Beidaihe seaside retreat for their annual summer meeting which, before, was commonly seen as a gathering of ruling elites from both current and elder cadres to decide China's destiny, and also an unnecessary waste of public funds. The move was seen by the Chinese public as symbolic of Hu's attitude towards corruption.

In June 2007, Hu gave an important speech at the Central Party School that was indicative of his position of power and his guiding philosophies. In the speech Hu used a very populist tone to appeal to ordinary Chinese, making serious note of the recent challenges China has been facing, especially with regards to income disparity. In addition, Hu noted the need for "increased democracy" in the country. Although the term has different meanings in the party than it does in the general Western sense, it shows that Hu's administration has placed political reform as an important part of the agenda in the coming years, a tone that was nonexistent during the Jiang era.

Media control

Despite initial expectations that Hu was a "closet liberal", Hu has shown a fairly hard-line approach to liberalisation of the media.

The media has been given greater latitude in reporting many topics of popular concern, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, as well as into malpractices at the local level. The government has also been responsive to criticism of its media policy, for example in response to the SARS epidemic, and in regard to public commemorations of popular, but deposed, former leader Zhao Ziyang.

Hu has been very cautious with regards to the Internet, choosing to censor politically sensitive material to a degree more strict than the Jiang era. In February 2007, Hu embarked on further domestic media controls that restricted primetime TV series to "morally correct" content—he objected to lowbrow programming including some reality shows—on all Chinese TV stations, and listed "20 forbidden areas" of coverage on news reporting.

Taiwan

Early in his presidency, Hu faced an independence-supporting counterpart in the form of then-President of the Republic of China Chen Shui-bian. Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the 1992 consensus. Chen Shui-bian and his party had continued to express an ultimate goal of Taiwanese independence, and make statements on the political status of Taiwan that the PRC considers provocative. Hu's initial response was a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. On the one hand, Hu expressed a flexibility to negotiate on many issues of concern to Taiwan. On the other hand, he continued to refuse talks without preconditions and remained committed to Chinese reunification as an ultimate goal. While Hu Jintao gave some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his 17 May Statement where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, Hu's government remains firm in its position that the Mainland side will not tolerate any attempt by the Taiwanese government to declare de jure independence from China.

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed tactics. Hu's government has conducted a no contact policy with the then Taipei administration due to Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP's independence leanings and repudiation of the 1992 consensus. The government maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress, formalising "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.

Hu's government increased contacts with the Kuomintang (KMT), its fundamental foe since the start of the Communist Revolution in the 1920s, and still a major party in Taiwan. The relationship between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang dates back to when the two parties twice co-operated in the Northern Expedition, only to become bitter foes during the Chinese civil war though they remained nominally allies during the war against Japan before hostilities resumed between them after 1945 and Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China, including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005.

On 20 March 2008, the Kuomintang won the presidency in Taiwan. It also has a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Compared to his predecessors, who often dictated conditions to Taiwan, Hu has been proactive in seeking ties with Taiwan, especially with the pro-unification Kuomintang party.

A series of historical meetings between the CPC and KMT have followed. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao held a historic meeting with ROC's then vice-president elect Vincent Siew as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia. On 28 May 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CPC and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should re-commence official dialogue under the 1992 consensus. Wu committed the new government in Taiwan against Taiwanese independence Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to allowing Taiwanese participation in the World Health Organization.

As well as the party-to-party channel, the semi-governmental dialogue channel via the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits is scheduled to re-open in June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Both Hu and his new counterpart Ma Ying-jeou agree that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the US President George W. Bush, in which he as the leader of CPC for the first time admitted that "1992 Consensus" sees "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition." The first priority for the SEF-ARATS meeting will be opening of the three links, especially direct flights between mainland China and Taiwan.

Moral guidance

In response to the great number of social problems in China, in March 2006, Hu Jintao released the "Eight Honors and Eight Shames" as a set of moral codes to be followed by the Chinese people, and emphasized the need to spread the message to youth. Alternatively known as the "Eight Honors and Disgraces", it contained eight poetic lines which summarized what a good citizen should regard as an honor and what to regard as a shame. It has been widely regarded as one of Hu Jintao's ideological solutions to the perceived increasing lack of morality in China after Chinese economic reforms brought in a generation of Chinese predominantly concerned with earning money and power in an increasingly frail social fabric.

It has become a norm for Chinese communist leaders to make their own contributions to Marxist theory. Whether this is Hu's contribution to Marxist theory is debatable, but its general reception with the Chinese public has been moderate. Its promotion, however, is visible almost everywhere: in classroom posters, banners on the street, and electronic display boards for the preparation of the 2008 Olympics, and World Expo 2010 in Shanghai. The codes differ from the ideologies of his predecessors, namely, Jiang's Three Represents, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Mao Zedong Thought in that the focus, for the first time, has been shifted to codifying moral standards as opposed to setting social or economic goals.

Personal life

Hu is married to Liu Yongqing, whom he met at Tsinghua University. They have two children together, Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing. Hu is the first PRC paramount leader to speak relatively unaccented Standard Chinese without strongly regional characteristics. He is well known as having a cautious attitude and a self-deprecatory personality. Unlike Wen Jiabao, the Premier, he has never granted a public one-on-one interview. He has been noted for his liking for table tennis and ballroom dancing. Hu is also said to possess a photographic memory that became evident in his high school days.

Notes

References

"Taiwan." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition. 12 Aug. 2008. APA style: Taiwan. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 12 August 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition

External links

Hu Jintao (ChinaVitae.com)

Hu Jintao calls for upholding Marxism (Xinhua)

Hu Jintao's political philosophies and policies by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn

China's leader shows his stripes 2005 BBC article arguing Hu more hardline than he initially appeared

Requiem for Reform? Zhao Ziyang's vision of political change in China dims as Hu Jintao hardens the Party line (Time Asia)

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Category:1942 births Category:Chinese engineers Category:Communist rulers Category:Current national leaders Category:Leaders of the Communist Party of China Category:Living people Category:People from Taizhou, Jiangsu Category:Presidents of the People's Republic of China Category:Tsinghua University alumni Category:Tuanpai Category:Vice Presidents of the People's Republic of China

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